

IAC-D-98

22 August 1955


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Glossary of Intelligence Terms

1. There is circulated herewith a memorandum from the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, recommending the establishment of an IAC ad-hoc committee to compile a glossary of terms used in NIE's.

2. In arriving at a decision on this matter, the IAC may wish to consider the advisability of not limiting the compilation of terms to those used in NIE's.

3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 30 August.



Secretary

25X1

NSC and JCS review(s) completed.

IAC-D-98

22 August 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

IAC-D-98
19 August 1955

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DDIM-20-55
16 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT: Glossary of Intelligence Terms

1. There has been, for some time, a need for a glossary of IAC agreed intelligence terms used in National Intelligence Estimates.
2. Therefore, it is recommended that an ad-hoc committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee be appointed to compile such a glossary for IAC approval.

/s/ EDWIN T. LAYTON
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

IAC-D-98
19 August 1955

IAC-D-97/1

Final

28 September 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

IAC Task Force on President's Proposal to Exchange

Military Blueprints with the USSR

Attached is the report of the Task Force as amended and
approved by the IAC on 27 September 1955.



Acting Secretary

25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

IAC-D-97/1
Final
28 September 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Report by the IAC Task Force on the President's
Proposal for Inspection

REFERENCE : IAC-M-209, IAC-M-210, IAC-D-97

1. The President's proposal sets in motion a series of expanding problems involving the formulation of an inspection system to provide warning of attack, negotiations for the adoption and implementation of this system, and formulation and negotiation of an arms limitation agreement together with an inspection system to insure compliance. While there are uncertainties concerning the exact form which the solutions will take as they are developed under the cross-examination of U.S. and allied interests, to say nothing of Soviet demands and conditions, these uncertainties do not obscure the key problem in the proposal, which is that of devising an inspection system for security against surprise attack.

2. It is the IAC's problem at this time to make sure that the resources of the intelligence community are properly marshalled to meet the requirements of the planners and negotiators. These requirements can be summarized under three major headings, current intelligence reporting, intelligence estimates, and intelligence support for the planning of the inspection system itself.

Current Intelligence Reporting:

Mr. Stassen has requested current intelligence support and is receiving this support through established channels. No IAC action is required.

Estimates as Required:

National Estimates have been provided to Mr. Stassen at his request. He will presumably continue to make such requests as the need arises, whether in support of the development of the plan or in support of the U.S. negotiators.

SECRET

SECRET

IAC-D-97/1

Final

28 September 1955

Intelligence Support for the Planning of an Inspection System:

For the development of the inspection plan Mr. Stassen has appointed eight task forces to consider the following aspects of the broad program: Army, Navy, Air, Atomic Energy, Industry and Power, Steel, Budget and Finance, and Communications. He has asked the Department of Defense to develop studies and recommendations and to participate in the work of the task forces, at the same time drawing his guidance for the major outline of the plan, including guide-lines of definition, from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn are drawing on the military departments. It is Mr. Stassen's intention that the task forces work directly with the appropriate executive departments and agencies in developing their parts of the inspection system, including the list of intelligence targets for inspection.

Mr. Stassen's schedule is as follows:

15 Oct.	Task Forces complete their parts of the plan
15 Oct. - 1 Nov.	Consolidation into one draft plan
1 Nov. - 1 Dec.	The draft plan in the hands of the departments and agencies of primary concern for official review and comments. (It is noted that Mr. Stassen will submit the draft plan to the Director of Central Intelligence.)

Submission to the President

The IAC has a clear and direct concern with an inspection system the first purpose of which is to produce the intelligence necessary for timely provision against surprise attack. The IAC Watch Committee and its supporting staffs, for example, must have an intimate knowledge of such a system and the assurance that it provides adequate coverage of all the places and activities which can provide forewarning of attack. An inspection list of such places and activities would become an essential part of the watch list and

- 2 -

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

IAC-D-97/1
Final
28 September 1955

the information produced by any inspection system would have to be considered by the Watch Committee. As the Watch Committee and its supporting staffs are concerned in the first objective of the inspection system, so the estimates staffs are concerned in the inspection system as a whole, with its prospect of unfolding to a coverage of essential information on Soviet developments and capabilities. Furthermore, the inspection system and its lists must be carefully studied by all the IAC collecting services

25X1

The individual members of the IAC are already contributing or will be asked to contribute to the development of the inspection plan in accordance with Mr. Stassen's requests and departmental instructions. When a consolidated draft of the inspection plan is ready it will be submitted to the departments and agencies of primary concern. At that time the IAC should take concerted action in effecting a coordinated review of and comment on the intelligence aspects and portions of the draft plan, including the inspection lists. There is one action, however, which it would seem prudent to take at this time and which can be taken without prejudice to or interference with the development of the plan. In order to prepare for the forthcoming review of the consolidated inspection plan it would be helpful to assemble a preliminary list of those critical intelligence targets which pertain to the prevention of surprise attack. The Watch Committee would be the natural facility in the IAC for this preparation.

When the consolidated draft of the inspection plan is ready, the IAC should effect a coordinated review of its intelligence aspects, including inspection lists, calling upon the Watch Committee for assistance insofar as the plan is or includes an inspection system which is to produce the intelligence necessary for timely provision against surprise attack. Comment on the plan might well take the form of a systematic estimate of the nature and degree of the security which the proposed system would give the U. S. in the light of the limitations inherent in the means of inspection, the

25X1

- 3 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IAC-D-97/1

Final

28 September 1955

3. Should an inspection system of any magnitude be put into effect, practical problems will arise involving manpower, organization, and administration within the intelligence community in relation to the inspection system and its reporting. Consideration of such problems, however, should await review of the plan.

4. Noting that the IAC members are participating or will participate through their own departments in the development of the inspection plan, the IAC Task Force on Inspection recommends that:

- a. The IAC coordinate the review of and the comment on the intelligence aspects and portions of the draft inspection plan as consolidated by Mr. Stassen.
- b. - The Watch Committee assemble departmental intelligence targets lists which pertain to intelligence necessary for timely provision against surprise attack, and undertake a preliminary examination of the whole from the point of view of their adequacy for the mission of the Watch Committee.
- c. The IAC dissolve its present Task Force on Inspection.

/s/

[Redacted Signature]

25X1

Chairman
IAC Task Force on Inspection

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IAC-D-97/1
9 September 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

IAC Task Force on President's Proposal to Exchange

Military Blueprints with the USSR

1. Attached is the report of the Task Force prepared pursuant to IAC-M-209, Item 9 a, 23 August 1955, as amended by IAC-M-210, Item 1, 30 August 1955.
2. This item will be placed on the Agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 1045 hours, Tuesday, 20 September.

25X1

Secretary

SECRET

IAC-D-97/1
9 September 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Report by the IAC Task Force on the President's
Proposal for Inspection

REFERENCE : IAC-M-209, IAC-M-210, IAC-D-97

1. The President's proposal sets in motion a series of expanding problems involving the formulation of an inspection system to provide warning of attack, negotiations for the adoption and implementation of this system, and formulation and negotiation of an arms limitation agreement together with an inspection system to insure compliance. While there are uncertainties concerning the exact form which the solutions will take as they are developed under the cross-examination of U.S. and allied interests, to say nothing of Soviet demands and conditions, these uncertainties do not obscure the key problem in the proposal, which is that of devising an inspection system for security against surprise attack.

2. It is the IAC's problem at this time to make sure that the resources of the intelligence community are properly marshalled to meet the requirements of the planners and negotiators. These requirements can be summarized under three major headings, current intelligence reporting, intelligence estimates, and intelligence support for the planning of the inspection system itself.

Current Intelligence Reporting:

Mr. Stassen has requested current intelligence support and is receiving this support through established channels. No IAC action is required.

Estimates as Required:

National Estimates have been provided to Mr. Stassen at his request. He will presumably continue to make such requests as the need arises, whether in support of the development of the plan or in support of the U.S. negotiators.

SECRET

IAC-D-97/1

9 September 1955

Intelligence Support for the Planning of an Inspection System:

For the development of the inspection plan Mr. Stassen has appointed eight task forces to consider the following aspects of the broad program: Army, Navy, Air, Atomic Energy, Industry and Power, Steel, Budget and Finance, and Communications. He has asked the Department of Defense to develop studies and recommendations and to participate in the work of the task forces, at the same time drawing his guidance for the major outline of the plan, including guide-lines of definition, from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn are drawing on the military departments. It is Mr. Stassen's intention that the task forces work directly with the appropriate executive departments and agencies in developing their parts of the inspection system, including the list of intelligence targets for inspection.

Mr. Stassen's schedule is as follows:

15 Oct.	Task Forces complete their parts of the plan
15 Oct. - 1 Nov.	Consolidation into one draft plan
1 Nov. - 1 Dec.	The draft plan in the hands of the departments and agencies of primary concern for official review and comments. (It is noted that Mr. Stassen will submit the draft plan to the Director of Central Intelligence.) Submission to the President

The IAC has a clear and direct concern with an inspection system the first purpose of which is to provide intelligence security against surprise attack. The IAC Watch Committee and its supporting staffs, for example, must have an intimate knowledge of such a system and the assurance that it provides adequate coverage of all the places and activities which can provide forewarning of attack. An inspection list of such places and activities would become an essential part of the watch list and the information produced by any inspection system would have to be considered by the Watch Committee.

- 2 -

SECRET

IAC-D-97/1
9 September 1955

As the Watch Committee and its supporting staffs are concerned in the first objective of the inspection system, so the estimates staffs are concerned in the inspection system as a whole, with its prospect of unfolding to a coverage of essential information on Soviet developments and capabilities. Furthermore, the inspection system and its lists must be carefully studied by all the IAC collecting services,

25X1

The individual members of the IAC are already contributing to the development of the inspection plan in accordance with Mr. Stassen's requests and departmental instructions. When a consolidated draft of the inspection plan is ready it will be submitted to the departments and agencies of primary concern. At that time the IAC should take concerted action in effecting a coordinated review of and comment on the intelligence aspects and portions of the draft plan, including the inspection lists. There is one action, however, which it would seem prudent to take at this time and which can be taken without prejudice to or interference with the development of the plan. In order to prepare for the forthcoming review of the consolidated inspection plan it would be helpful to assemble a preliminary list of those critical intelligence targets which pertain to the prevention of surprise attack. The Watch Committee would be the natural facility in the IAC for this preparation.

When the consolidated draft of the inspection plan is ready, the IAC should effect a coordinated review of its intelligence aspects, including inspection lists, calling upon the Watch Committee for assistance insofar as the plan is or includes an inspection system to provide intelligence security against surprise attack. Comment on the plan might well take the form of a systematic estimate of the nature and degree of the security which the proposed system would give the U. S. in the light of the limitations inherent in the means

25X1

- 3 -

SECRET

IAC-D-97/1
9 September 1955

3. Should an inspection system of any magnitude be put into effect, practical problems will arise involving manpower, organization, and administration within the intelligence community in relation to the inspection system and its reporting. Consideration of such problems, however, should await review of the plan.

4. Noting that the IAC members are participating through their own departments in the development of the inspection plan, the IAC Task Force on Inspection recommends that:

- a. The IAC coordinate the review of and the comment on the intelligence aspects and portions of the draft inspection plan as consolidated by Mr. Stassen.
- b. The Watch Committee assemble departmental intelligence targets lists which pertain to the prevention of surprise attack, and undertake a preliminary examination of the whole from the point of view of their adequacy for the mission of the Watch Committee.
- c. The IAC dissolve its present Task Force on Inspection.

/s/

Chairman

IAC Task Force on Inspection

25X1

SECRET

100-5111
SECRET


IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

2 IAC Task Force on President's Proposal to Exchange
Military Blueprints with the USSR

1. The IAC directed the Task Force to prepare terms of reference as its first order of business, and to submit them for IAC approval. (IAC-M-205, Item 9, 26 July 1955, as amended by IAC-M-206, Item 1g)
2. Attached are the terms of reference drafted by the Task Force for IAC consideration.
3. This matter has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 10:45 Tuesday, 23 August.

25X1


Secretary

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

SECRET

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

IAC TASK FORCE
ON PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL
PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The IAC asked the Task Force to study US intelligence requirements and implications of any program designed to implement the President's proposal for a US-Soviet exchange of military blueprints and aerial inspection.

The President's Proposal

"I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves -- immediately. These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country -- we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations and by this step convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension."

2. The President's proposal falls under the general heading of "security," as opposed to disarmament; more specifically under the

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

heading of "military security," security of the nation against military attack by the USSR. More specifically still, the President's proposal aims at providing against the element of surprise in the event of attack or as he stated, "great surprise attack." The President's proposal would superimpose on existing means of intelligence collection a method which would provide evidence from direct observation, although limited by the media themselves.

3. It is noted that the President's proposal calls for the exchange of a "complete blueprint of our military establishments," and for "aerial reconnaissance" which appears to be restricted to aerial photography. Since such limitation may be more implied than intended, the task force proposes to consider other means of inspection as well.

4. "Great surprise attack" is interpreted to mean any surprise attack which would jeopardize the basic strengths and interests of the United States. (Minor border clashes or incidents would not be included.) Such an attack would involve direct assault to the full extent of Soviet military capabilities, including the use of mass destruction weapons (atomic, biological and/or chemical).

5. The President's proposal calls for a bilateral arrangement between the US and the USSR in order to "convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack." Because one cannot separate US security realistically from intelligence of Soviet-controlled and closely allied areas and because one cannot separate US security realistically from that of allied powers, especially those wherein US forward bases are located, the IAC believes that the areas to be inspected may go beyond continental limits of the US and the USSR.

II. DEFINITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

To develop the intelligence requirements necessary to insure the US against a surprise attack by the USSR and to analyze the possibility of their satisfaction under any conditions for exchange of information and any conditions for mutual inspection.

- 2 -

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

a. Method of Procedure: First to establish the requirements and then to define the media, if possible, in such fashion as to provide information constituting an acceptable minimum of protection against surprise attack.

b. The requirements should be developed and organized in a manner which will cover: first, the strictest interpretation of the proposal, viz. surprise attack from the USSR proper against the US proper; second, successively broader interpretations which would (1) expand the area from which surprise attack could be launched to include Soviet allied and satellite territory, (2) expand the target of attack to include US forward bases and US allies, and (3) provide for protection against the secret development of relatively greater Soviet military capabilities.

III. ASSUMPTIONS

It is assumed that:

a. The Soviet Union accepts the President's proposal.

b. The Task Force is not concerned with the various contingencies that will arise in the course of negotiations, but only with the determination of those intelligence requirements and the conditions for their satisfaction adequate to insure advance knowledge of preparations for attack.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Intelligence Requirements

1. Inasmuch as this section of the study goes to the heart of our military intelligence problem with respect to the Communist power, it is proposed that each service develop its own lists in accordance with II (2) above, and that these lists then be consolidated under the appropriate headings. As for example, the first list:

- 3 -

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

Attack against the continental US from bases within the USSR:

- a. Bases from which air attacks could be launched against the US.
- b. Order of Battle of Long-Range Air forces.
- c. Production facilities for long-range aircraft.
- d. Storage and assembly points for nuclear weapons.
- e. Production facilities for nuclear weapons.
- f. Launching facilities for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.
- g. Order of Battle for ICBM units.
- h. Production and storage facilities for ICBM's.
- i. Fleet bases, submarine loadings and dispositions.
- j. Order of Battle of Soviet long-range submarines.
- k. Production and Storage facilities for BW and CW agents.

The second list would be supplementary to the first: For example:

Attack against US forces and installations abroad from bases within the USSR:

- a. Army forces in forward areas.
- b. Forward airbases in areas of the USSR adjacent to locations of US forces abroad.
- c. Order of Battle of Soviet ground forces.
- d. Order of Battle of Soviet tactical airforces.
- e. Military stockpiles in forward areas.

- 4 -

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

f. Transportation system serving forward units.

(NOTE: The additional supplementary lists would be similarly constructed to exhaust the possibilities mentioned in II b. above.)

2. The individual items listed under the appropriate headings would be accompanied by a brief justification and explanation of its critical character, such that the lists could serve as an initial handbook or guide, for the study of "blueprints," for purposes of aerial photography and interpretation, or for other means of inspection.

3. Consideration must be given to the degree of adequacy of our intelligence relating to the USSR and consequently to the basis for exploiting and utilizing the additional means of acquiring information under an inspection system.

a. Given the state of our knowledge of developments within the USSR, can we draw up a list of intelligence requirements which would insure adequate coverage of the danger points?

b. Would an extended period of "cut and try" be necessary before we could rely on an inspection program to the degree anticipated by the President's proposal?

B. Means of Inspection

1. Military Blueprints

A "complete military blueprint" is an exhaustive and accurate listing of forces, their disposition, strength and equipment, and installations of a military or military-supporting nature.

a. What are the limitations inherent in such a means of acquiring information?

b. What are the possibilities for deception and concealment?

c. Frequency of exchange

- 5 -

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

- d. Estimate of quantity
- e. Methods of checking and confirming
- f. How far would a complete military blueprint go in satisfaction of the requirements?
- g. If anything less than a complete blueprint is involved, what is the minimum acceptable?

2. Aerial reconnaissance (photography)

- a. What are the limitations inherent in such a means of acquiring information?
- b. What are the optimum and minimum acceptable conditions (altitude, equipment, freedom of movement)?
- c. What are the possibilities for deception and concealment?
- d. What frequency is required for critical intelligence targets?
- e. Estimate of quantity
- f. Methods of checking and confirming
- g. How far would aerial photography go in satisfaction of the requirements?

3. Relation between blueprints and aerial photography and assessment of their combined results in fulfillment of intelligence requirements.

4. Other means of inspection, such as:

- a. Aerial reconnaissance to include electronic, visual, and other techniques in addition to photography.
- b. Ground observer teams.

- 6 -

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

C. Re-examination of US advance and early-warning capabilities

1. What provision must be made for most rapid processing and communication of information obtained?
2. Assessment of possible advantages to be gained for US intelligence as compared with present situation.
3. Possible disadvantages.

D. Possible Implications

NOTE: The considerations which follow are more appropriately dealt with in a National Estimate and not as part of the Task Force's study.

1. Would implementation of the President's proposal be interpreted in world opinion as effectively negating the possibility of nuclear warfare?
2. If so, does the proposal offer greater freedom of action to the Communists in other fields of conflict or competition?
3. If the possibility of nuclear warfare has acted as an inhibitor, what will be the effect of its apparent removal on "little" and "local" wars or on the prosecution of Communist influence by means short of limited war in critical and undecided areas?

V. CONCLUSION

Nature and degree of the security which would accrue to the US from an implementation of the President's proposal.

- 7 -

SECRET

IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

SECRET

IAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Emergency Planning of the Scientific Estimates Committee

The attached report to the Chairman, IAC, by the Chairman, Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC), relating to emergency planning by the SEC, is circulated for information. This paper was prepared in compliance with the recommendation in paragraph IV, 2 e of IAC-D-96/2, 3 April 1956, as approved by the IAC (IAC-M-237, 17 April 1956, item 3 a).

Secretary

25X1

Attachment

SECRET

SECRETC
O
P
YIAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Emergency Planning of the Scientific Estimates Committee

REFERENCES : a. IAC-D-96/2, 3 April 1956
b. IAC-M-237, 17 April 1956, item 3 a

Introduction

1. Pursuant to the recommendation of paragraph IV, 2, e of Reference a, which was approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) as recorded in Reference b, the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) submits its concept of an SEC wartime plan of operation. In the judgment of the SEC, this paper provides a framework for detailed planning to meet emergency situations under anticipated types of warfare.

Assumptions

2. The National Security Council (NSC) will continue to look to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for national intelligence advice and support under wartime conditions.
3. The IAC will continue to be charged with its present mission and functions under emergency conditions.
4. The present subcommittee-IAC relationship will continue.
5. The joint responsibilities of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense for the wartime conduct of clandestine activities are not within the scope of this paper.

SEC Wartime Mission and Functions

6. The SEC mission will remain within the framework determined by Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 3/4 (DCID 3/4), with the exception that production of NIS Chapter VII,

SECRET

SECRETIAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957

"Scientific," is expected to be greatly curtailed under wartime conditions. Excluding those areas of responsibility assigned by DCID 3/4 to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and to the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC), the SEC will devote itself primarily to integration of scientific and technical intelligence contributions to national intelligence estimates and to coordination of intelligence with respect to foreign, chiefly enemy, technological developments.*

SEC Wartime Organization and Membership

7. The organization of the SEC will remain unchanged in a wartime situation except for the addition of such ad hoc representation as may be deemed necessary for the duration of the emergency by the regular committee members or by the IAC. For example, it is understood that the wartime director of scientific research in the national mobilization structure will be eligible for representation in the SEC.

SEC Secretariat

8. CIA will continue to provide the executive secretary and secretariat, [redacted] The mission of the secretariat will remain unchanged.

25X1

SEC Meetings

9. The chairman will call SEC meetings as required to fulfill the committee's mission. The secretary will notify members of the time and place of SEC meetings through the respective duty officers of the SEC member agencies.

* See Annex for the SEC's present concept of its wartime mission.

SECRET

SECRET

IAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957

Vital Documents

25X1 10. The secretariat has ensured storage [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] of SEC vital documents, including SEC agenda, minutes of
meetings, memoranda, reports, surveys, publications, agreed working
papers, and draft contributions to national intelligence estimates. It
will arrange for reproduction of such material as required for SEC
use.

/s/

[redacted] 25X1
Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee

Enclosure: Annex

7 March 1957

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

IAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957

ANNEX

**EMERGENCY PLANNING OF THE
SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE**

The SEC's Present Concept of Its Wartime Mission

Under wartime conditions the SEC will:

- a. Coordinate national intelligence on foreign, chiefly enemy, developments in science and technology as it contributes to our knowledge of enemy potentials, exploitable vulnerabilities, and intentions, with the proviso that designation of operational targets is not generally comprehended in this function, although specific exceptions may require SEC action. The SEC will be prepared to coordinate current scientific and technical intelligence within its purview, produce periodic and special reports on foreign, chiefly enemy, developments in science and technology, prepare spot evaluations as required, and make short-term projections.
- b. Integrate scientific and technical intelligence contributions to post-hostilities planning at the national intelligence level. This function will normally be fulfilled in compliance with IAC action.
- c. Provide scientific intelligence support within its sphere of responsibility to appropriate levels, including that of the wartime director for scientific research, in the national mobilization structure.

SECRET